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COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 
SINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
attorney for Plaintiff 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
relephone: 484-7632 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT ) 
UNION, a Utah corporation, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. McPHIE 
Plaintiff, ) FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
V. ) Civil No. 85CVM-06470 
JEAN ASAY, ) Judge Griffiths 
Defendant- ) 
Third Party Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
DONNA NELSON and HARPER R. ) 
NELSON, ) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW David A. McPhie, attorney for the plaintiff in 
the above captioned matter, and being first duly sworn and upon 
oath, deposes and states that: 
1. In connection with the above captioned case, I 
rendered services to the LDS Church Employees Credit Union on the 
dates indicated, and billed them the amounts of money for the 
services indicated as being rendered listed on Schedule A 
attached hereto. 
2. In that all of the work performed, or costs incurred, 
as described in the entries marked with a H*ff were performed 
directly in pursuance of the plaintiffs complaint against the 
defendant, and not in investigation or defense against the 
counterclaim of the defendant* 
3. The work performed, and the monies billed to the 
plaintiff for the services marked with a "#" of Schedule A, were 
rendered for purposes of defending against the counterclaim of 
the defendant• 
4. Costs incurred in this case are in the amounts of 
$12.50 for filing, $6,75 for service of process and $280.20 in 
deposition costs. The deposisions taken pursued both plaintiffs 
complaint and defendants counterclaim. 
5. The attorneys fees indicated in this affidavit 
include defending against the defendants and third party 
defendants objections to the proposed order of the plaintiff 
prepared subsequent to trial, and indicated with a "+". 
6. This is the end of my affidavit. 
DATED this /rday of March, 1987. 
David A. McPhie 
^> A/y*t*U 
sworn t o jbefore me on„ t h i s / /? & 
-SA 
NOTARY PUBLIt in and for 
Salt Lake/County 
of 
// 
Schedule A 
* = plaintiffs complaint 
# = defendants counterclaim 
+ = plaintiffs defense against objections to proposed order 
1985 
Amount S 
9/25 
Dictation of summons and complaint 150.00* 
9/25 
Review of drafts of summons and complaint 15.00* 
9/25 
Filing fee 12.50* 
10/85 
Service of process 6.75* 
11/13 
Dictation of reply to counterclaim 30.00# 
11/14 
Preparation of reply to counterclaim 6.00# 
11/14 
Review of reply to counterclaim 22.50# 
1986 
1/13 
Dictation of notice of deposition 18.00* 
18.00# 
2/12 
Preparation for deposition, travel, conference 81.00* 
81.00# 
2/13 
Deposition 67.50* 
67.50# 
2/86 Deposition costs 140.10* 
140.10# 
Dictation of motion for summary judgment, 
affidavit of Tom Capece, notice of hearing 150.uO* 
/27 
eview/revision of motion, affidavit 
/4 
ravel for signature on affidavit 
/16 
sview of motion to amend counteclaim, counter-
laim, affidavit of Paul Clint 
/24 
Durt appeaarance on MSJ, their motion to amend 
18.OCA 
40.00# 
100.00* 
20.0G# 
'24 
Lctation of order denying SJ, request for trial 125,00* 
'6 
.ctation of motion to dismiss counterclaim, 
>.t up depositions, interrogatories, requests 
>r the production of documents, schedule conf. 80.00# 
200.00* 
ctation of letter to Trujillo 
8 
eparation of motion to dismiss, calls to 
lsons, notices of deposition 
12 
eting with CU on case, notes 
14 
aparation for deposition, Clint, Nelsons 
14 
Icing of depositions 
station of letter to atty Garett for Nelsons 
>earance at motion to dismiss 
40.00* 
16.00# 
56. 00** 
60.00* 
20.00# 
60.00* 
60.00# 
32.00# 
80.00# 
sting with CU persons on answers to interroga-
tes 
tation of responses to discovery 
128.00# 
80.00# 
13 
4. Grant Defendant attorney fees against Third Party 
Defendants for a Bad Faith refusal to admit their debt when it 
was due, and an asserted defense without merit, which they 
abandoned on the day of trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of August, 1987. 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
Mailed the Original and five copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, SLC, Utah, 84102; and two 
copies each to David A. McPhie, attorney for Plaintiff, 3450 S. 
Highland Drive, Suite 301, SLC, Utah 84106 and Michael A. Katz, 
attorney for Third Party Defendants, 311 South State Street, 
Suite 320, SKC, Utah 84111, postage prepaid this 25th of August, 
1987, 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
* * * 
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , C i v i l No. 85CVM-6470 
v s . D e p o s i t i o n of: 
JEAN ASAY, JEAN ASAY 
Defendant. 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of February, 
1986, the deposition of JEAN ASAY, produced as a witness by 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action 
in the above-named Court, was taken before Cecllee Gruendell, 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:22 o'clock 
a.m. of said day, at the offices of David A. McPhie, 56 East 
Broadway, Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
That the said deposition was taken pursuant to 
Notice. 
• * * 
I put t h i s d e l i c a t e l y , d i d n ' t t e l l t h e t r u t h on o n e l o a n , s o 
it was den ied him, and h e was a p p l y i n g f o r a n o t h e r l o a n 
31 through a n o t h e r company. 
* Q To p a y f o r t h e h o u s e ? 
5 A Yes, t h e whole h o u s e . I n o r d e r t o q u a l i f y f o r 
6 that loan, he n e e d e d some s e c u r i t y , wh ich would h a v e b e e n 
7 money in a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t . 
8 Q You mean h e n e e d e d t o b e a b l e t o show t h a t h e h a d 
9 some money i n a b a n k somewhere? 
10 A Tha t h e h a d some money i n a bank, y e s . So we had 
11 the c a s h money. 
12 Q when y o u s a y "we/ ' TVC? 
13 A TVC h a d t h e c a s h money. We went down t o LDS 
14 Credit Union w h e r e Mr. H a r p e r b a n k e d . 
15 Q Mr. H a r p e r ? 
16 A E x c u s e me, we a l w a y s c a l l e d him H a r p e r . Mr. 
17 Harper Ne l son was h i s name. 
18 Q When y o u s a y we went down, who wen t down? 
19 A L inda T h a y n e a n d myself . S h e was a n o t h e r p e r s o n 
20 t ha t worked t h e r e . 
21 Q Okay. 
22 A Took the money, and put it in Harper's, Mr. 
23 Nelson's savings, account, which was his wife's, Dona Nelson. 
24 Q Okay. 
25 MR. TRUJILLO: Her name a t t h a t t ime was? 
7 
THE WITNESS: Dona Brighton. 
Q (BY MR. McPHIE) Before she married Mr. Nelson? 
A Nelson, I be l i eve . 
Q Go ahead. What happened next? 
A Put the money in h i s account and borrowed i t back 
out.. 
Q Well, when you say "borrowed i t back out/1 took 
out a loan a t t he c r e d i t union. You didn ' t t ake t hose ve ry 
dollars out of t h a t account? 
A Right. So we had, in a sense , a secured loan, was 
my understanding, t h a t t h e loan was secured, and that when 
the loan closed on t h e i r house, t h e money would be paid back. 
1/ me, Jean Asay pe r sona l ly , would be r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e 
interes t . I t was a v e r b a l agreement between Mr. Nelson and 
myself tha t he would t a k e c a r e of t h a t . But t ha t f s n e i t h e r 
here nor the re . 
Q When you say i t was a v e r b a l agreement? 
A J u s t to ld me i t wouldnft have amounted to, I 
believe $100. 
Q So if I unde r s t and i t , your p lan was, TVC would go 
put the money in Nelson's account , and i t ended up, Mrs. 
Nelson's account, and offer t h a t a s s e c u r i t y on a loan t h a t 
you would get from the c r e d i t jmnion, you pe r s ona l l y would ge t 
from the c red i t union? 
A Uh-huh. I s a t t h e r e in Mrs. Sa r to r i f s office, 
8 
however you say it, and asked her numerable times, "Are you 
sure this money is secure? This is a lot of money for me. 
Are you sure that nobody can touch this money without my 
signature?" She said yes. Two or three times I asked her 
with Miss Thayne sitting there, "Are you sure?" She said, 
"No one can touch that money without your signature." I 
said, "Okay." 
Q Without your signature? 
A Uh-huh. Then I understood that it would be mine 
and Dona's that it would require, and so I felt pretty 
comfortable that the money, when the time came, would be 
there to pay the loan off. 
Q Okay. Let me take you back to the loan situation 
where you were applying for the loan. So you're saying that 
the $5,000 that went into the Nelson account was TVC money? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q When you went in to borrow the $5,000 from the 
credit union, what you essentially told the loan officer, 
whoever you dealt with, was, "If you'll loan me $5,000, me 
personally, I will secure payment of my $5,000 loan by 
pledging the money that's in Nelson's share account"? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Mrs. Nelson, was she wil l ing to do tha t ? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay, was she t h e r e ? 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
* * * 
LDS 
UNIO 
JEAN 
CHURCH EMPLOYEES 
N, a 
vs. 
ASAY 
CREDIT ) 
Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 85 06470 
Deposition of: 
PAUL FRANKLIN CLINT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Wednesday, the 14th day of 
May, 1986, commencing at the hour of 2:40 p.m., the 
deposition of PAUL FRANKLIN CLINT, produced as a witness 
at the instance of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action 
now pending in the above-named Court, was taken before 
JILL DUNFORD, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public, in and for the State of Utah, at the offices of 
David A. McPhie, 56 East Broadway, Suite 600, Salt Lake 
City, Utah; and 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
* * * 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH S4UH 
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A No. 
Q Was a deal ever made between the Nelsons and 
TVC concerning the building of a home on that lot? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the nature of the deal? 
A We acted as go-between. 
Q When you say we, you mean TVC? 
A Between them and the builders, coordinated 
the efforts to acquire the lot, worked out a process on 
a plan whereby they could acquire equity using access to 
some exchange privileges they had as a result of their 
employment. 
Q Who was the builder? 
A Hang on—they say you block out unpleasant 
memories. 
Q Do you not presently remember the name of the 
builder? 
A I'm sorry, I don't. I'll think of it in a minute. 
Q Mr. Nelson has testified that as the time came 
to anticipate the home being completed and it became 
time to obtain long-time financing for the home, it became 
apparent that he would need to show that he had enough 
money in the bank to cover closing costs in order to obtain 
the financing, and that they did not have enough money to 
demonstrate to a lender that he could cover the closing 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
10 
costs, and that it was agreed between himself and TVC 
through you that monies could be put in his account at the 
LDS Church Employees Credit Union for purposes of it 
appearing that he had enough money. Do you recall any 
such agreement with him or anything like that? 
A You bet. 
Q Tell me in a nutshell, was my statement fairly 
accurate or would you like to explain that? Is it different 
than what I stated? 
A A little bit different. 
Q Give me your version, would you. 
A The purpose was t o — 
Q The purpose of what? 
A The purpose of the process that we went through 
was to create funds where none existed. TVC went through 
situations where, from time to time when we received 
payments, that we had the use of for a few days and then 
had to pay out to someone else. 
So we developed a process whereby we would deposit 
the money in the Nelsons' account. We arranged an agreement 
with the LDS Credit Union to use his account as collateral 
for someone else other than the Nelsons to borrow the 
money back using the account as collateral. In essence, 
to create funds where none had existed prior. The money 
was not real, it was not really there, because the loan 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
11 
and the deposit canceled each other out. 
Q You didn't tell me anything about your agreement 
with Mr. Nelson. 
A The agreement was to effect just exactly what 
I described. 
Q So $5,000 was deposited by TVC into Mr. Nelson's 
savings account? 
A Yes. 
Q This was an account that you and she had gone 
in together to the credit union earlier and opened; is 
that correct? 
A I am under the impression that it was an account 
that they had already had, it was an existing account. 
Q Well, not to challenge you, but just to refresh 
your memory if it's true, Mrs. Nelson testified 10 minutes 
ago that the actual sequence was that you and she went in, 
opened up an account in her name, and she put $25 in it. 
A Okay. 
Q And your testimony now is that TVC through you 
later put $5,000 into that savings account in Mrs. Nelson's 
name. 
A That's right. 
Q And your testimony is that your purpose in 
doing that was to accomplish two things: One, have sufficient 
monies in the Nelsons' account that they could qualify for 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
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back to close 
have the money to cover the closing costs, 
,288.50 out of Mrs. Nelson's account, the 
the $5,000 had been placed in and come 
and use that to cover the closing costs? 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
Michael A. Katz, #3817 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
ATTORNEYS FOR T h i r d P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 3 2 0 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 3 3 2 - 2 7 0 7 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
L.D.S. CHURCH EMPLOYEES 
CREDIT UNION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JEAN ASAY, 
Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DONNA NELSON and 
HARPER R. NELSON, 
Third Partv Defendants. 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85CVM-06470 
Pursuant to Rule 68(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Third Party Defendants Donna Nelson and Harper R. Nelson 
make an offer of judgment in favor of Jean Asay in the sum 
of $711.50. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 1987. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
Michael A. Katz 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January, 1987, 
I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Offer of Judgment to: 
Mr. Jose Luis Trujillo 
Attorney at Law 
967 East 4800 South, Suite 3A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Mr. David A. McPhie 
Attorney at Law 
56 E. Broadway, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael A. Katz, #3817 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
ATTORNEYS FOR T h i r d P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 3 2 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 1 8 0 1 ) 3 3 2 - 2 7 0 7 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
L.D.S. CHURCH EMPLOYEES 
CREDIT UNION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JEAN ASAY, 
Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DONNA NELSON and 
HARPER R. NELSON, 
Third Party Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice for the Circuit 
Courts, State of Utah, Third Party Defendants Donna Nelson 
and Harper R. Nelson hereby object to the proposed Order and 
Judgment submitted by Plaintiff L.D.S. Church Employees 
Credit Union as to the specific item of attorney's fees as 
set forth therein. 
OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85CVM-06A70 
This objection is based upon the pleadings and papers 
on file with the Court, the trial of this matter on January 
27, 1987, and the argument set forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
Paragraph E of the Judgment sets forth the Plaintiff's 
claimed entitlement to attorney's fees in the sum of 
$2,500.00. Those fees were awarded by the Court in its 
verbal ruling following trial. However, such fees must be 
rejected or, at the minimum, reduced substantially as a 
matter of law. 
Utah follows the well-established majority rule that 
attorney's fees can only be recovered if provided for by 
statute or a contract existing between the parties, B & R 
Supply Co. vs. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 
(1972). On our facts, there existed a Note running to 
Plaintiff executed by Jean Asay whereby Defendant agreed to 
pay those attorney's fees incurred in collection. Admitted-
ly, Plaintiff did file suit on the Note in these proceedings 
premised upon Defendant's failure to pay. It is noted that 
no demand for payment was made upon Harper and Donna Nelson 
prior to instituting litigation. But, if an award of attor-
ney's fees is based upon a contract, as here, the award must 
be strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract. 
Any services rendered which fall outside of collecting on 
the Note must be disallowed. With that substantial 
-2-
limitation in mind, one should review the allegations raised 
in this lawsuit. 
The majority of Plaintiff's counsel's time devoted to 
this case was incurred in defending against Defendant's 
Counterclaim for fraud. This includes most of the discovery 
conducted. Pursuant to the rules of apportionment, 
announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Farm Production 
Credit Ass'n vs. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah, 1981), those fees 
must be disallowed. A copy of that important decision is 
attached for the Court's consideration. 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n vs. Cox, plaintiff 
sued on a promissory note in the precise manner as occurred 
in the case at bar. In response, the defendant/borrower 
counterclaimed for an alleged mishandling of the loan as did 
Jean Asay in our instance. Relying on the earlier case of 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah, 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court held: " . . . the plaintiff was not entitled 
to reimbursement for fees he had incurred in defending a 
counterclaim." 627 P.2d at 66. 
The Court then went further and found that where the 
Court is left without a means to determine that portion of 
fees attributed to prosecuting the complaint, as contrasted 
with that portion spent in defending the counterclaim, the 
entire award of attorney's costs must fall. Unless counsel 
<r ~ ~~~ ' """•" * 
for the credit union made the necessary distinction, the 
$2,500.00 claim must clearly fail in accord with the cited 
Utah cases. 
-^-
Apart from the need to apportion, other limitations are 
put upon Plaintiff's rights to recover attorney's fees which 
apply on our facts. An appellate court will only uphold 
such an award where the amount is reasonable. And in the 
Court's consideration of reasonableness, the principal 
factor is the relationship of the fee to the amount 
recovered. Turtle Management, Inc. vs. Haggis Management, 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah, 1982). Where the principal amount 
recovered is approximately 1/3 of the attorney's fees 
sought, the Court must substantially reduce the fees or the 
award becomes unreasonable. On our facts, this also 
indicates how Plaintiff spent substantially more time 
defending against Jean Asayfs Counterclaim in relation to 
time spent recovering the Promissory Note indebtedness. 
It may be argued that the Nelsons, as Third Party 
Defendants, have no right to object to the Credit Union's 
claims. So long as those fees are ultimately assessed 
against the Third Party Defendants as apparently happened 
here, their objection is well noted. At the commencement of 
trial on January 27, 1987, the objection of the Nelsons to 
any assessment of attorney's fees was made before the Court 
and opposing counsel. 
In view of Plaintiff's failure to apportion his fees as 
strictly required by Utah law, and the underlying unreason-
ableness of those fees, Third Party Defendants Harper and 
Donna Nelson object to any award thereof. 
-4-
DATED th i s H Ti day of February, 1987. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^j~ day °f February, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objections to 
Proposed Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
David A. McPhie, Esq. 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
3450 So. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. Jose Luis Truiillo 
Attorney at Law 
967 East 4800 South, Suite 3A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
W/fa >A^L 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT ) 
UNION, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 85 CVM 6470 
vs. ) HEARING 
JEAN ASAY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of March, 1987, 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable L. H. Griffiths, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: MR. DAVID A. McPHIE 
Attorney at Law 
3450 South Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
For the Defendant: MR. MICHAEL A. KATZ 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MR. J. L. TRUJILLO 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84l0t 
2 
3
 THE COURT: This is the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, 
4
 the Murray Department. Jfm Judge L.H. Griffiths. This is the 
5 19th day of March, 1987. 
6 Itfs time for the matter of LDS Church Employees Credit 
7
 Union vs. Jean Asay, defendant and third-party plaintiff, vs. 
8 Donna and Harper R. Nelson, third-party defendants, Case No. 
9 85 Civil 6470. 
1° Now, we had a trial and there was a judgment entered 
11 in this matter. I'm not sure just what this hearing is today. 
12 MR. McPHIE: For the record, David McPhie, for the 
13 plaintiff. We did have a trial in this matter and I did send in 
14 a proposed order within the time allowed, I believe, by law, I 
15 did receive an objection to my proposed order from Mr. Katz, 
16 representing the third-party defendant, and then subsequently I 
17 received an objection to my proposed order, essentially joining in 
16 the motion of Mr. Katz by the defendant. 
19 I—then we were notified by the Court of this date and 
20 the purpose of this hearing is to resolve questions as to which 
21 order should be entered and if no appropriate order is before the 
22 Court, what an appropriate order should contain. The objections 
23 I of Mr. Katz and the defendant, to the best of my knowledge, are 
24 that the attorney's fees awarded were excessive and that they 
25 did not—for two reasons. One, that they're just excessive 
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1 to trial, to add up the time that I was in this case. She told me 
2 I that I was in it 18, 19, 20 hours. I came in and testified about 
that and said that I antici—that that didn't include time I'd 
4 I spent preparing and actual trial time that day and so my testimony 
5 was what it was and the Court made its order. 
Because of the memorandum of points and authorities 
that Mr. Katz filed, and we agree with this point, it became 
clear to me that I had to separate out time soent defending 
9 I against the counterclaim. So, I asked my secretary to actually 
10 pull the time slips themselves, which I had not seen prior to 
u j coming to Court. And we made, from the actual time slips, an 
affidavit which I have submitted to the Court and which I have 
submitted to Mr. Katz, but he only got it yesterday, and which I 
submitted to Jean Asay's lawyer, but I don't know if he's got it, 
where I've got all the time and all the services listed and I 
have the services that were directly in pursuit of the complaint 
makred with an asterisk. I have the services that were directly 
resol—or directly involved with defending against the counter-
claim marked with a pound sign, and I took the billings that 
involved deposition, where we inquired as to both the plaintiff's 
cause of action and the anticipated counterclaim and I split the 
costs—-I split the billings between counterclaim and plaintiff's 
cause equally. 
There's also in this affidavit three items that are mark* 
w.ii. iH.iih.-i .in asterisk nor a pound sign but are marked with a pi 
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1
 THE COURT: Well, I—I don't think that there's 
2 anything to--
3
 MR. McPHIE: I will say this for Mr. Katz's position. 
4
 J know that he was offering the money through the thing, clear 
5
 back in the fall of 1986, because Mr. Trujillo, the defendant's 
6 counsel, was calling me and saying, if you will settle for the 
7
 amount that he has agreed to pay, that is Nelson to Asay, we will 
8
 pass it through to you, and I said, we will not settle because of 
9
 the fees. And I did make an error in my testimony to you. I 
10 said 1 hadn't seen Mr. Ellis until the day of trial. I did see 
11 Mr. Ellis in the down—in the Salt Lake Department of the Circuit 
12 Court a few days before trial, at which time I indicated that the 
13 matter wasn't settling for the offer of the Nelsons to the Asays 
14 because of the fees of the plaintiff. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess if we leave it up to 
16 human, we can complicate just about anything to the point that 
17 it's really difficult to follow where equity lies in certain 
18 things. You can talk about procedure and the Rules of Civil 
19 Procedure, and they're laid out so that everything should work 
20 along orderly. You have substantive laws which regards to when 
21 attorney fees are—should be allowed, and then we can add all of 
22 the different types of peripheral things that in effect affect 
23 all of these rules and substantive laws. 
24 When we had this lawsuit, it was apparent to myself, 
25 as the Judge, as I ruled on it after hearing the evidence, that 
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1
 Jean Asay owed some money to the credit union. The Nelsons had 
2
 already stated to me at the beginning of the trial, through Mr, 
3 Katz, that they owed Jean Asay. They said that, and I accepted 
4 it, and Mr. Katz left. 
5 we had a difficult case from the standpoint that we, 
6 the parties were—felt very strongly about their points. We had 
7 testimony, it wasn't simple testimony, even though you're talking 
8 about a si'.pie note, there were several of the witnesses who, 
9 particularly as I remember, Mr. Clint, who in effect is—several 
10 times in that trial, I had to caution him that he wasn't really a 
11 party to the action, and he was trying to make statements like a 
12 party to the action. In fact, right at the beginning, I had to 
13 tell him that he was—he was out of order, that he wasn't a party 
14 to the action, he wasn't Jean Asay and his—the attorney for Jean 
15 Asay would have to be heard. 
16 I didn't know why, what the circumstances were right at 
17 the beginning, I thought it was kind of strange for Mr. Clint to 
18 be attempting to speak on behalf of Jean Asay, and then I found, 
19 after the testimony came in, it to be apparent that Jean Asay 
20 didn't appear, that Jean Asay was, in effect, a front for Mr. 
21 Clint. She was in fact, as I remember the testimony, his 
22 secretary. That, for some reason, the two notes were taken out in 
23 her name, but she was doing it more as a—either as a friend or 
24 as an employee of him. And why he didn't take it out in his own 
25 name, I have no way of knowing, and I guess there's a good reason, 
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1
 but that be--it wasn't important to me after awhile. 
2
 Jean Asay, from the standpoint that she didn't show up, 
3
 apparently had been assured by someone, that no matter what 
4
 happened, she was—judgment or no judgment, she wasn't going to 
5
 be really hurt, because if she was, I guess I'd—at least as far 
6 as if I was her, I'd have been here; but she apparently had been 
7
 assured by somebody that you won't need to come because we're 
8
 talking about, you know, nearly a thousand dollars, if you take 
9
 just the basic amount that was owed, plus interest and the Court 
1° costs. 
11 And now, it wasn't into this case very long that I 
12 could see that whatever the principal amount was involved, the 
13 attorney's fees was going to be another matter. Here we had a 
14 case that was a year-and-a-half old, that had a lot of hours in 
15 it. And I'm not—and as I say, I'm well aware of this problem, 
16 where we have a case that after it's—everything is said and done 
17 in it, that you have an attorney fee that's say, three times the 
18 amount of the note, the principal that the party sued on. 
19 I can remember the discussion with a Supreme Court 
20 Justice about this. He—we were talking about being on the 
21 bench, it's not a new subject, we hear it at the Bar bulletins, 
22 how can we hold down the cost of suits, this particular case that 
23 I just spoke to the Justice, he had on his desk, and he had to 
24 decide, had nothing to do with this matter, but it was similar 
25 in that he had a judgment for one of the parties in the neighborho 
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CONCLUSION: 
This is a simple matter, in which the Defendant, Jean 
Asay was put into financial peril because she trusted the 
Nelsons to honor their committment to pay off a loan she 
obtained thru her employer for the Nelsons' benefit. When they 
defaulted, the Credit Union found it more to their benefit to 
sue Mrs. Asay, than to pursue the Nelsons1 whose overdraft of a 
different account cause the shortage in the first instance; the 
Credit Union made that election because they had a written 
promise to pay attorney fees. They never attempted in any way to 
collect the money from the Nelsons. 
Not content to stick an innocent person with attorney 
fees, the Credit Union attorney made claim for all the fees 
expended by him in the case, not making any effort in the trial 
to apportion the fees. Apparently being of the pursuasion that 
he could collect fees not only in connection with the action on 
the note, but also for work expended to defend the Credit Union 
against a Counterclaim, the only testimony on fees given at 
trial included both. 
Following the trial the Court called a hearing on the 
objections filed by Defendant and Third Party Defendants, and 
revised its Judgment; appeal followed, and based on the 
foregoing, this court should : 
1. Grant Judgment to the Defendant on her Counterclaim 
for bad faith on the part of the Credit Union in using her funds 
to cover other persons debts. 
2. Stike down the award in favor of Plaintiff and 
against Defendant, the debt sued upon being admittedly owed by 
the Third Party Defendants, and not by Defendant. 
3. Deny Plaintiff any attorney fees, for failure to 
properly apportion his charges. 
II 
savings account at the Credit Union. Mrs. Asay, to accommodate 
the Nelsons, borrowed from the same Credit Union the closing 
costs of $5,000., the Nelsons were to pay the loan off as 
payments became due. Contrary to that agreement, the Nelsons 
overdrafted their checking account at the Credit Union. The 
Credit Union, contrary to their committment to not invade the 
money Clint had put into Savings, under his secretary Jean 
Asay's name, covered Nelsons1 overdraft by dipping into the 
savings account. When the $5,000. note came due, the savings 
account was short by $877.03 of the amount necessary to pay the 
note. The Credit Union, knowing that the money was owed by the 
Nelsons, and not by Mrs. Asay, still elected to sue Mrs. Asay 
because they had her signature on a note which provided for the 
assessment of attorney fees, (see Transcript, Exhibit "E", p 29.) 
The Nelsons1 according to Plaintiff counsel's 
statements, could have settled the case at any time, by paying 
the $877.03, but they would not and did not pay the money until 
after the matter had been through court, and Mrs. Asay had been 
stuck with their bad bill. It was only after this appeal was 
filed that counsel foi the Nelsons tendered payment for the 
amount of their overdraft, interest, and costs. After this 
appeal was on file, the money was paid, and counsel for Nelsons 
went back to the lower court and obtained an order for 
Satisfaction of the Judgment. That order is in limbo, waiting 
for resolution of the appeal. 
The described sequence of events, plus the fact that 
the Nelsons admitted liability, on the day of the trial, which 
they did not even attend, indicates extreme bad faith on th^ir 
part. The looming question is, "Why did they not pay the money 
when it was due, why did they intentionally and knowingly leave 
the innocent Mrs. Asay to face an unnecessary legal action 
before they finally acknowledged their debt?" 
10 
d. Apart from the need to apportion, our appellate 
courts have refused to grant attorney fees which are 
disproportionate to the amount sued for. (Turtle 
Management Inc. vs Haggis Management, 645 P. 2d 667, 
Utah 1982.) Any experienced lawyer knows that proving 
a promissory note, where the existence of the note and 
it's signature by defendant is admitted, is the 
simplest type of legal action. Plaintiff's counsel, 
having failed to present any apportionment during trial 
pursuaded the court to accept an affidavit, (Exhibit 
"F"), which accounts for $2096.85 in time for doing the 
note foreclosure, and only $1,101.10 in time for 
defending against the Counterclaim. A brief look at 
the Exhibits attached as "A", "B", and "C shows that 
the real thrust of all the discovery, and the major use 
of lawyer time in this case was defense against the 
Counterclaim. Since the Affidavit itself was not part 
of the Trial, the Court, absent a motion to reopen to 
receive additional evidence, could not rely on that 
affidavit in awarding fees. 
5. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO BAD FAITH ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS, 
78-27-56 UCA was enacted by the Legislature in 1981 to 
remedy situations where a party to an action does not act in 
good faith, but makes the other party "go through the hoops" 
unnecessarily. 
In this case, the Third Party Defendants, the Nelsons, 
in order to obtain a housing loan, entered into an agreement to 
put money belonging to a fourth party, Mr. Clint, into their 
9 
the Court did sign. He admits that an Objection to that 
proposed Judgment was timely filedr (ignoring the fact that 
defendant had also objected, see Transcript, Exhibit "E",p36), 
and that the purpose of the Hearing was to resolve the issue 
here on appeal; towit, whether the Court was free to award 
attorney fees on a promissory note, when a large portion of the 
attorney's time was spent on defending the plaintiff against a 
Counterclaim* 
Mr. Katz, attorney for Third Party Defendants submitted 
in his Objection (Exhibit nDn) such an excellently written 
argument, that it is necessary here only to adopt that argument 
in whole, by reference, and present only a capsule resume: 
a. Attorney fees can only be awarded in Utah if there is 
an underlying Statute or Contract, on which the suit is 
successfully prosecuted, (quoting B & R Supply vs. 
Bringhurst, 28 Ut 2nd 442, 503 P.2d 1216). 
b. Any services to plaintiff by counsel, not lying 
within the parameters of the suit for collection of 
the note are not includeable. (Utah Farm Production 
Credit Ass'n vs. Cox 627 P2d 62, (Ut 1981)). The 
doctrine of apportionment in Cox is derived from the 
earlier case of Stubbs V. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168 (1977) 
In Cox, the court held, "...the plaintiff was not 
entitled to reimbursement for fees he had incurred in 
defending a counterclaim." 627 P.2d at 66. 
c.The Cox case decision goes further, and holds that 
where the plaintiff's attorney does not apportion his 
time, as between the complaint, and defense of the 
counterclaim, the court is powerless to grant any fees. 
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paragraph b. of Rule 68, nor was it a tender of money 
which may be accomplished under paragraph a. of Rule 68 
up to the date of the trial. 
b. An Offer of Judgment under paragraph 68b. requires a 
minimum of 10 days before trial so that the other party 
may either accept or reject the offer. Under the 
circumstances, it was not a valid prefer , and entitled 
the Third Party Defendants to no protection. 
c. The Offer of Judgment, in order to be valid under 
Rule 68b, must be at least as advantageous as the 
ultimate judgment, including costs, or it gives not 
protection to the offeror. In this case, the Judgment 
rendered by the court was for more money ($877.03), 
than the amount of the offer, ($711.50), so the offer 
is not effective. The offer is also silent with 
respect to costs, the Judgment awarded costs of $194. 
and interest of $272. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF, WHEN 
THE EVIDENCE INCLUDED NO ATTEMPT TO APPORTION THE FEES. 
Exhibit "C" attached is the amended Judgment signed by 
Judge Griffiths after the March 18th hearing, the Transcript of 
which is attached as Exhibit "En . The hearing was convened on 
motion of the court, following the filing of Objections (Exhibit 
WD") by both Defendant and Third Party Defendants. 
Exhibit "C", prepared by Plaintiff's Counsel, is 
designated as a "Judgment", but essentially rehearses all of the 
Findings of Fact, plus the action taken at the second Hearing, 
plus the amended Judgment. 
On page 3 of Exhibit "C", counsel admits that he 
submitted a proposed order (meaning the first Judgment), which 
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indicates that the true facts were known by Mr. Clint, as well 
as by Plaintiff's attorney. In the trial however, the Judge 
took the rather peculiar position that because Clint arranged 
for his secretary, Mrs. Asay to obtain the loan in her name, 
that somehow that barred Clint from testifying about things 
which he knew, because he was not a party, and the judge refused 
to allow the man to testify!(see Transcript, p.30, Exhibit "E"). 
78-24-1 and 2, UCA provide that any person competent to 
perceive is deemed competent to be a witness. There is no 
requirement in the law that a person must be a party in order to 
testify about facts within his knowledge. The judge went on to 
draw some very strange conclusions, based on no evidence, that 
because Jean Asay did not show up on the date of the trial, that 
./someone , that no matter what happened, she was — judgment or 
no judgment, she wasn't going to be really hurt.*/ (Transcript, 
p. 31). As a matter of fact, Mrs. Asay did not appear because 
she went to the wrong court building. The judge's bias is too 
apparent to need comment. His prejudice against Paul Clint Left 
a gap in the testimony such that the Judge dismissed defendants' 
counterclaim, though the salient^ facts appear in the deposition, 
which was published, and were well known to plaintiff and its 
counsel, as appears in the depositions, Exhibits "A" & wBne 
3. WHETHER THE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT MADE A VALID 
PROFER OF JUDGMENT. 
On the morning of the trial, January 26,1987, the Third 
Party Defendants thru their attorney, delivered to the court a 
document entitled, "OFFER OF JUDGMENT", (Exhibit "C",attached). 
Although it purports to be pursuant to Rule 68(b), URCP, the 
offer fails in several ways to comply with the rule. 
a. It was not made 10 days before trial, as required by 
6 
Credit Union took money which all parties involved knew belonged 
to Jean Asay's employer, and used it to cover the Nelsons1 bad 
checks. The Credit Union's attorney was well familiar with the 
situation, and its attorney discussed the situation in Exhibit 
"B®, attached; 
(question by Mr. McPhie) "..what in fact happened was 
that the Nelsons simply overdrafted their checking 
account at the credit union and the credit union 
covered their overdraft on their checking account with 
their savings account until their savings account was 
exhausted and the seven-hundred-something dollars that 
had remained in their savings were all exhausted 
through covering overdrafts on the Nelsons' checking 
account..." 
The Judge erred in not granting Defendants the relief 
sought in their counter-claim, his prejudice is apparent in the 
comments he made in the Hearing Transcript pp 30, that even 
though the Nelsons were the ones who used the money which should 
have paid the note in full, and the Credit Union appropriated 
money out of a restricted account, to make it easy on 
themselves, that he still held the Plaintiff's entitled to 
Judgment against Defendants. His conclusions are illogical in 
light of the facts. Defendant was in fact the victim? it was 
her money which the credit union took to cover the Nelsons' 
overdraft, and to charge her with the shortage only adds insult 
to injury. 
2. THE JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PAUL CLINT TO TESTIFY 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In this matter, the Plaintiff took the depositions of 
Paul Clint, Jean Asay and Mr. Nelson. The deposition of Clint 
was published at the trial, and Exhibit "B" contains salient 
portions of the questions propounded to Mr. Clint. It clearly 
5 
the second hearing, after the Judgment had already been signedf 
an affidavit from David A. McPhie, (Exhibit "F" attached) which 
purported to separate the fees on the note action from those on 
the Counterclaim. A copy of the amended Judgment is attached as 
Exhibit "G". 
E. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
1. Defendant v/as not liable to Plaintiff on the note, 
and the sums appropriated by Plaintiff from Defendant's 
account should have been offset against the note. 
2. The Judge's refusal to allow Paul Clint to testify 
was prejudicial error, 
3. The Third Party Plaintiffs' Offer of Judgment was 
ineffectual and did not preclude the court granting 
judgment against the Third party, who really owed the 
money to the Plaintiff for which Plaintiff sued 
Defendant. 
4. Plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees where 
counsel did not apportion his time and fees between the 
note, which provided for attorney fees, and defense of 
the counterclaim which <<3id not. 
5. Defendant is entitled to attorney fees against the 
Third Party Defendants, who admitted all along that 
they owed the money in contest, but delayed paying it 
until after the litigation was in court. 
F. ARGUMENTS: 
1. DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF ON THE NOTE, 
AND WAS ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR AMOUNTS TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT'S 
ACCOUNT TO COVER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S BAD CHECKS. 
The simple truth in this case, as stated by the judge 
in his summation (Transcript p.29- 30, copy attached as Exhibit 
"H") was that the Nelsons, who had written bad checks on their 
account at the Credit Union, stood by and did nothing while the 
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employer, to cover the bounced check, (Clint deposition, p.20-21 
copies of the Clint deposition pages are attached as Exhibit 
,fB"). 
This created a $877.03 difference between the amount 
in the savings account under the Nelson's name, and the balance 
due on Mrs. Asay's note. The Credit Union, rather than collect 
the money from the Nelsons, whom they knew oWed it, elected to 
sue Mrs. Asay on her note, because against her they could claim 
attorney fees. 
The morning of the trial, the Nelsons1 attorney Mr. 
Katz appeared before the court, and submitted to the court a 
document entitled "Offer of Judgment" (Copy attached as Exhibit 
"C"). No money was paid, the sum "offered", $711.50, was less 
than the amount later determined to be owed by Nelsons, and did 
not include costs as required by Rule 68b. Nelsons1 attorney did 
not stay for the trial. The "Offer" was not timely, and at the 
end of the trial, the court awarded Judgment against the Nelsons 
for the same amount as it awarded Judgment to Plaintiff and 
against Defendant, $877.03, plus $2500. attorney fees, plus 
costs and interest. 
The Nelsons1 attorney filed an objection to the 
proposed Order and Judgment, in which the undersigned joined, 
insofar as it related to the granting of attorney fees to 
Plaintiff. 
The court held a second hearing, and after noting that 
Mr. Katz correctly cited the applicable law (see Third Party 
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Judgment, copy attached as 
Exhibit "D"), the court acknowledged that it had erred in 
granting attorney's fees without requiring apportionment, 
(Hearing Transcript, p32, copy attached as Exhibit "E"). The 
Court erred again, in accepting, some weeks after the trial, at 
3 
Simultaneously the court ruled that Defendant was 
entitled to the same Judgment against Third Party Defendant. 
Third Party Defendant objected to the proposed Judgment, on the 
grounds that there had been no apportionment of the attorney 
fees and there was no written agreement for the third party to 
pay attorney fees to Defendant, and to strike the award of 
attorney fees altogether because Plaintiff, in his presenting of 
evidence in support of his claim for fees, did not apportion the 
fees as between the time spent on the promissory note suit, and 
that spent on defense of the Counterclaim. 
i 
Defendant joined in the Objection. Upon hearing, the 
Court admitted that it had erred in not apportioning the fees, 
but accepted an affidavit filed at the second hearing which 
purported to apportion the fees. The court amended the Judgment 
to make the attorney fees $2,000. The amended judgment, was 
signed March 25, 1987, defendant appealed April 14, 1987, on all 
issues. 
2. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: As a part of a real estate 
transaction between Defendant Asay's employer, Paul Clint and 
the Third Party Defendants, Nelsons, the Nelsons were required 
to show that they had money in the bank for closing costs. Clint 
put $5,000. in a Credit Union Savings Account in the NelsonBs 
name, with an agreement that the Nelsons would pay off a $5,000. 
promissory note to the Credit Union, borrowed by Jean Asay. 
(Paul Clint deposition, pp.9-12; Jean Asay deposition, pp 6-8, 
Asay deposition pages attached as Exhibit "A"). 
The Nelsons, who had a checking account thru the same 
Credit Union, bounced a check (or checks), which the Credit 
Union covered (without informing Asay) by simply taking the 
money out of the Savings Account money belonging to Asay's 
2 
C. STATUTES, RULES & CAMS DBmmrMVTTKt 
1# 78-24-1&2 UCA 
2. Rule 68b, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "At any 
time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party 
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse 
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him 
for the money or property or to the effect specified in 
his offer, with costs then accrued....11 
3. B&R SUPPLY vs. BRINGHURST 28 Ut2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 
4. Utah Farm Production vs. Cox 627 P.2d 62 
5. Stubbs vs. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168 
6. Turtle Management vs. Haggis 645 P.2d 667. 
7. 78-27-56 UCA. "In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement, the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith." 
D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW:' 
After a non-jury trial, the Circuit Court granted 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendant on a 
$877.03 balance due on a $5,000. note. The court also awarded 
Attorney fees of $2500., not apportioning fees in connection 
with suit on the note, from fees incurred to defend against the 
Counterclaim. The Court dismissed the Counterclaim, which was 
based on defendant's contention that she had posted $5,000. cash 
with the Credit Union to guarantee Third Party Defendants' 
payment of the note, but that the Credit Union had, contrary to 
instructions, invaded the $5,000. to cover a check overdraft on 
Third Party Defendants' checking account, and that the $877.03 
balance due on the note was not Defendant's fault. 
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CASE NO. 87-0161CA 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
Appeal from a Judgment from the Fifth 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department, the Honorable 
LeRoy H. Griffiths, Judge 
GLEN J. ELLIS 
ELLIS & ELLIS, ATTORNEYS 
60 E. 100 S. Suite 102 
PO Box 1097 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
DAVID MCPHIE 
3450 S. Highland Drive, 
Suite 301, 
SLC, Utah 841.06 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent 
Attorney for Appellants 
Michael A. Katz 
3.11 S State Suite 320 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants. 
8/11 
Review of answers to interrogatires, motion, 
trial date 32.00# 
8/11 
Preparation of final answers to interrogatories, 
request for production, motion compel, affidavit, 
for fees 22.00# 
9/2 
Dictation of notice of continuance on motion to 
compel, meeting with Trujillo 26.00# 
30.00* 
10/22 
Call from Trujillo, Re: Nelson default, he wanted 
payoff 16,00* 
11/5 
Call to Trujillo to quote fees and costs to date J^LfUQa*!-' 
11/7 
Call to Trujillo, he had settlemen offer, rejected, 
aslced for continuance said we would not agree "18,00* ? 
11/13 
Preparation for trial (||54«00* 
1 2 / 1
 -* 
Preparation of new request for trial setting lp50,00* * 
1987 
! 
1/7 
Call to Tom to notify about trail, set up 
meeting day before 18,00* 
1/27 
Conference with Tom and Mary in preparation 
for t r i a l ' i i7 fqp,* 
V27 ^ ^ ,.,. ,. 
Preparation for and appearance a t t r i a l 4HKL a 0 C * **»• 
100.00#" 
1/28 
Dictation of judgment 90.00* 
1/29 
Preparation of judgment, copies, mailing 18.00* 
3 
2/12 
Review of objections to orders by Nelsens, 
reschedule instructions 90.00+ 
3/86 
Research law in support of proposed motion 80.00+ 
3/86 
Preparation of memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of proposed motion 150.00+ 
* = 2,096.85 
ft = 1,101.10 
+ = 320.00 
Total Fees = $3,517.85 
DAVID A. MCPHIE, #2216 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-7632 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEAN ASAY, 
Defendant-
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONNA NELSON and HARPER R. 
NELSON, 
Third Party Defendants. 
THIS MATTER came on for trial before the Honorable Judge 
L.H. Griffiths, in his courtroom located at 5025 S. State street, 
Murray, Utah, at the regularly scheduled time, that being on 
Tuesday, the 27th day of January, 1987, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
The plaintiff appeared through its authorized agents, Tom 
Capece and Mary Sartori, and through their attorney of record, 
David A. McPhie. The defendant Jean Asay did not appear, but was 
represented by her attorneys of record, Jose Luis Trujillo and 
Glen Ellis. The third party defendants, Nelson, did not appear, 
but were represented by their attorney of record, Michael A. 
FILED 
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JUDGMENT 
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Katz. 
The court first considered the motion of counsel for the 
defendant to withdraw from the case, along with the motion filed 
the previous day by proposed substitute counsel, Glen Ellis. The 
court having found that the matter had previously been set for 
trial on two separate occasions and that the motions for 
withdrawal of counsel and continuance were brought on the date of 
trial, the court denied both motions. 
Counsel for the third party defendants Nelson, did submit 
both orally and in writing, an offer of judgment, which offer was 
accepted by defendant through her counsel, and by the court. 
Counsel for plaintiff made an opening statement, as did 
counsel for the defendant. The court received testimony, 
proffer, of evidence and argument fro* both the plaintiff and 
defendant concerning both the complaint and the counterclaim. 
Subsequent to the presentation of the defendants case in chief on 
her counterclaim, counsel for the plaintiff made a motion for 
dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendant. No testimony was 
given in support of the defendants third-party complaint. 
The court having considered the testimony, documents 
admitted into evidence, the proffers of evidence and arguments of 
both counsel, having considered the file, and good cause 
appearing therefor, did grant the motion of the plaintiff, 
dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant. 
Further, based on the testimony, documents admitted into 
STATE CTbTAH \ . . . 
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igood cause therefor, the court entered a judgment on behalf of 
|the plaintiff as against the defendant Jean Asay, in the amounts 
jof: 
A. $877.03 in principal; 
B. $272.00 in interest at the note rate from March 11th, 
1985, until the date of trial; 
C. Costs of court in the amount of $194.00; 
D. Attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00; 
E. For a total judgment in the amount of $3,843.03, with 
| a provision that said judgment should bear interest at the note 
'rate, that being at 16.5% per annum, until paid in full. 
Further, counsel for plaintiff submitted a proposed order 
:which the court did sign. 
Subsequently, counsel for third-party defendants, Nelson, 
jdid file an objection to the proposed order of the plaintiff. 
jJThe defendant, Jean Asay, did, through her counsel, join in the 
objection to plaintiffs proposed order. Further, that the court 
jdid schedule for purposes of resolving said disputes about 
[plaintiffs proposed order, a hearing held on the 18th day of 
(March, 1987, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the court. Further, 
that the plaintiff appeared through its counsel, David A. McPhie. 
Defendant appeared through her counsel, Glen Ellis, and third-
(party defendants appeared through their counsel, Michael Katz. 
Counsel for all parties made proffers of evidence and 
argument to the court concerning the objections of the defendant 
;ffT^ r 7^^ ?T ^ ^l1^3 t h i r d~P a r tY defendants to the proposed order of the 
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plaintiff, and the court having heard the matter fully, and 
aaving considered the file, and good cause appearing therefor, 
low amends its former ruling in the above captioned matter, and 
nakes the following order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff 
OB awarded judgment against the defendant as follows: 
A. In the principal amount of $877.03; 
B. Interest thereon at the note rate from March 11th, 
L985 until the date of trial in the amount of $272.00? 
C* Costs of court in the amount of $194.00; 
E. Attorneys fees in the amount of $2,000.00; 
F. For a total judgment in favor of the plaintiff as 
against the defendant, Jean Asay, in the amount of $3,343.03. It 
Ls the further order of the court that this judgment bear 
Lnterest at the note rate, that being at the rate of 16.5% per 
innum, until paid in full. 
It is the further order of the court that this order be 
entered nunc pro tunc in place of the order previously signed, 
md effective dated the 25th day of February, 1987. 
DATED this 2 ^ daY of - /TJMAI , 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 4.5 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing judgment to the following in accordance with Rule 4.5 
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